An Assessment of Alternatives for the Dutch First Pension Pillar, The Design of Pension Schemes
It does so by setting up a stochastic partial equilibrium model to study intragenerational insurance, which inlcudes longevity and productivity risk. The model shows the welfare, labour-market, saving and unintended-bequest effects of a shift from a Beveridge towards a Bismarck system in which pension rights depend on labour-market history. The main conclusion is that a shift of the first pillar pensions from a Beveridge towards a Bismarck system is not necessarily welfare improving from an ex-ante insurance perspective, i.e. before the veil of ignorance is lifted. Moreover, a means test of the first pillar against wealth income, which implies a lower AOW when an individual has wealth income and a lower pension premium for everyone, does not improve welfare in the setting of the model considered in this paper.