Seminar: Going Once, Going Twice, Reported! Cartel Activity and the Effectiveness of Antitrust Policies in Experimental Auctions

Time: 13.00-14.00 hours
Location: CPB-office, Van Stolkweg 14, The Hague

Presentation: Sander Onderstal (UvA)

Discussant: Remco Mocking (CPB)

Language: English

Registration:  Please register by sending an email to seminars@cpb.nl.

Abstract subject
We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditional antitrust policy (without a leniency program) and modern antitrust policy (with a leniency program). In EN, neither antitrust policy has a significant effect on cartel deterrence, cartel stability, cartel recidivism, and winning bids. In FP, traditional antitrust policy deters cartel formation, destabilizes cartels, reduces the probability that a cartel re-establishes, and reduces the average winning bid. In contrast, while a leniency program has no additional effect on cartel formation or cartel recidivism, it makes cartels more stable and reduces the winning cartel bid.

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