Forecasting, policy evaluation and the budgetary process

Lessons from the Netherlands

by

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Outline

CPB forecasting practice

- ► short term (annual) budget cycle
- medium term (4 years) election platforms, coalition agreement
- long term (several decades) ageing study


Position of CPB

- Conditions for quality and independence
- ► IMF enthousiastic

Lessons

Brussels, 21-6-2006

CPB forecasting practice...



Short term

- timing: fixed quarterly schedule
- covers current year and next year
- draft figures available to Ministries (and usually leaked to the press)
- draft texts discussed with cabinet

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Medium term

timing: political cycle

- every new cabinet
- study group, election platforms, coalitions agreement

two scenarios

- cautious / optimistic (about potential growth)
- end-year cyclically neutral

relation with budgetary framework

- asymmetric loss => use cautious scenario
- cyclical fluctuations accommodated by deficit

Implementation

- cautious scenario is baseline...
 - for assessment election platforms
 - for coalition negotiations
- and benchmark
 - updated baseline + effects coalition agreement defines real expenditure ceilings in new cabinet period
- system supported by
 - advice (Study Group, Social Economic Council)
 - ▶ no formal rules

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Evaluation election platforms


- Budgetary calculation
 - ► EMU deficit (medium term)
 - sustainable surplus (long term)
- Effect on human capital formation
- Cost benefit analysis of new infrastructure and environmental policies


Long term

- Ageing study
 - measure: robust primary surplus (excl. natural gas and interest payments)
 - Mushgrave criterium for intergenerational fairness
- Long term scenario's

Net gain of the government








Relation CPB - politicians

- CPB makes forecast and
- ... evaluates policies
- No obligation to use CPB forecast
- Coalition government
- Comparable to independence of Central Bank

Coalition negotiations...



NO CHEMISTRY

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Position of CPB (1)

- Part of Ministry of Economic Affairs
 - ► Budget (11,5 mln), labour statute
 - Outside requests need Minister's fiat
- No political interference with methods and analysis
- No paid assignments from private parties or local government
- About 15% project funding
 - Ministries
 - ► EU, OECD

Position of CPB (2)

- Advice on work program from
 - Central Planning Commission
 - Committee for Economic Affairs
- Quality ensured by
 - ► Open attitude, transparency, accountability
 - ▶ Broad scope, comprehensive knowledge base
 - Active contacts with scientific community
 - ► Peer evaluations, reviews, ...
- Protocol contains code of conduct
- Good staff, many persons have Phd's (economics, physics, math)

Independence

- formal rules not decisive
- CPB relies largely on quality (track record, trust, public opinion)
- refrain from political statements (e.g. no unconditional advice)
- checks and balances (external scrutiny and reviews)
- crucial for hiring staff

essons from NL

Lessons (1)

Independent quality forecasts

- help improve the quality of the policy debate
 - avoid political quarrels about assumptions
- cannot remove uncertainty, but help cope with it
- lead to better policies??
 - Persson & Tabellini "Effect of constitutions"
 - Dewatripont & Tirole "Advocates"

from NL

Lessons (2)

Safeguards for independence

- rules are not decisive
 - institutional setup country-specific
- checks and balances
 - trust must be earned
 - reputation is crucial
- competion between forecast?
 - mean diversion effect
 - political clientele
- freedom of publication
 - visit us at www.cpb.nl

Good idea?

THEY EASILY FIND THOSE 20 BLN IN SAVINGS

